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Abstract. The Posterior distribution of the Likelihood Ratio (PLR) is proposed by Dempster
in 1974 for significance testing in the simple vs composite hypotheses case. In this hypotheses
test case, classical frequentist and Bayesian hypotheses tests are irreconcilable, as emphasized
by Lindley’s paradox, Berger & Selke in 1987 and many others. However, Dempster shows that
the PLR (with inner threshold 1) is equal to the frequentist p-value in the simple Gaussian case.
In 1997, Aitkin extends this result by adding a nuisance parameter and showing its asymptotic
validity under more general distributions. Here we extend the reconciliation between the PLR
and a frequentist p-value for a finite sample, through a framework analogous to the Stein’s
theorem frame in which a credible (Bayesian) domain is equal to a confidence (frequentist)
domain.
This general reconciliation result only concerns simple vs composite hypotheses testing. The
measures proposed by Aitkin in 2010 and Evans in 1997 have interesting properties and extend
Dempster’s PLR but only by adding a nuisance parameter. Here we propose two extensions of
the PLR concept to the general composite vs composite hypotheses test. The first extension
can be defined for improper priors as soon as the posterior is proper. The second extension
appears from a new Bayesian-type Neyman-Pearson lemma and emphasizes, from a Bayesian
perspective, the role of the LR as a discrepancy variable for hypothesis testing.
1. Introduction
1.1. Classical hypotheses test methodologies. Simple versus composite hypotheses testing
is a general statistical issue in parametric modeling. It consists for a given observed dataset x
in choosing among the hypotheses
H0 : θ = θ0 H1 : θ ∈ Θ1(1)
where the distribution of x is characterized by the underlying unknown parameter θ. Under the
alternative hypothesis H1, θ takes a value different from the point θ0, and the uncertainty of θ
is described by a prior probability density function pi1(θ) which is positive only for θ ∈ Θ1. We
assume that the data model p(x|θ) has the same expression under H0 and H1.
To choose among H0 and H1, a test statistic T (x) (such as the Generalized Likelihood Ratio)
is generally compared to a threshold ζ and one decides to choose H0 if T (x) is greater than ζ. If
H1 is chosen whereas the true underlying θ was equal to θ0, a type I error is made in the decision.
Under the classical Neyman paradigm (see Neyman and Pearson (1933); Neyman (1977)), the
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threshold ζ is chosen so that the probability of the type I error lies under (or is equal to) some
fixed level α, typically a 5% error rate. Instead of inverting this function, a p-value can be
defined in order to serve as the test statistic to be directly compared to the 5% level (Lehmann
and Romano (2005)):
pval(T (x0)) = Pr(T (x0) < T (x)|θ0)(2)
where x0 is the observed dataset and x the variable of integration. Note that with this notation,
H0 is rejected when pval(T (x0)) is greater than some threshold.
On the Bayesian side, the test statistic classically used (Robert (2007)) is the Bayes Factor
(BF) defined by
BF(x) =
p(x|θ0)∫
dθ p(x|θ)pi1(θ)
Making a binary decision consists of choosing H0 if BF(x) is greater than some threshold, and the
choice of the threshold is made in general by a straight interpretation of the BF. The Jeffreys’s
scale for example states that if the observed BF is between 10 and 100 there is a strong evidence
in favor of H0. The mere posterior probability Pr(Hi|x) of an hypothesis may also be considered
by itself.
A practical issue of the BF in the simple vs composite hypotheses test is that it is defined up
to a multiplicative constant if the prior pi1 is improper1 even though the posterior distribution
is proper. Partial BFs account for this issue by somehow using part of the data to update the
prior into a proper posterior, and then use this posterior as the prior for the rest of the data.
The most simply defined Partial BF is the Fractional BF (FBF) proposed by O’Hagan (1995).
A related and more fundamental issue is Lindley’s paradox, initially studied by Jeffreys (1961)
and called a paradox by Lindley (1957), which shows among others that, when testing a simple
vs a composite hypothesis, the null hypothesis H0 is too highly favoured against H1 for a natural
diffuse prior under Θ1. More precisely, for example in the test of the mean of a Gaussian
likelihood, the p-value |x| defines the uniformly most powerful test, which is a very strong
optimal property even according to at least part of the Bayesian community. However, for a
fixed prior and some dataset x that adjusts so that the associated classical p-value remains fixed
(so that the evidence for H0 shall not change), Pr(H0|x)/Pr(H1|x) tends to 1 as the sample
size increases. This issue, intensively discussed and developed (see Tsao (2006) for a quite recent
study), is consensually considered as a real trouble by a quite large part of the community. Unlike
the BF, other tests like the FBF or the Bernardo (2011) test do not suffer from this problem in
Lindley’s frame. Other ideas have been developed which prevent Lindley’s frame from occurring,
avoiding troubles for the BF. Berger and Delampady (1987) for example argue that testing a
simple hypothesis is an unreasonable question. Some other references will be given in the section
2.1.
Among many frequentist and Bayesian p-values (several are listed by Robins et al. (2000)),
the next most classical Bayesian-type hypotheses test statistic is the posterior predictive p-value,
highlighted by Meng (1994). Unlike the BF which only integrates over the parameter space
Θ, the posterior predictive p-value integrates over the data space X , like frequentist p-values.
But unlike the frequentist p-value which integrates under the frequentist likelihood p(x|θ0), it
integrates under the predictive likelihood p(xpred|x0) =
∫
dθ p(xpred|θ)pi(θ|x0) where x0 is the
observed dataset. In a frequentist p-value only a statistic (ie a function of x only) can define
the domain of integration. On the contrary, in the posterior predictive p-value, a discrepancy
variable (function of both x and θ) can be used to define the domain of integration. Note that
the choice of the discrepancy variable to use there remains an issue.
Although a bit less classical, the approach of Evans (1997) needs to be introduced because
the tool and some of its properties are interesting and closely related to the ones derived in this
paper. In the simple vs composite test case presented up to now, the tool proposed by Evans
1pi1 is called improper if its integral over Θ1 is infinite, which occurs if pi1 is constant over an unbounded
domain for example.
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(1997) and the ones studied in this paper are even mathematically equal. But the tool proposed
by Evans (1997) is defined to test more generally H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0 for a parameter of interest
ψ = Ψ(θ). The test statistic consists of measuring the Observed Relative Surprise (ORS) related
to the hypotheses by computing:
ORS(x) = Pr
(
piΨ(Ψ(θ)|x)
piΨ(Ψ(θ))
≥ piΨ(ψ0|x)
piΨ(ψ0)
∣∣∣∣x)(3)
The relative belief ratio of ψ defined by RB(ψ) = piΨ(Ψ(θ)|x)piΨ(Ψ(θ))−1 is measuring the change
in belief in ψ being the true value of Ψ(θ) from a priori to a posteriori. So if RB(ψ0) > 1 we
have evidence in favor of H0. Relative belief ratios are discussed in Baskurt and Evans (2013)
where RB(ψ0) is presented as the evidence for or against H0 and (3) is presented as a measure
of the reliability of this evidence. This leads to a possible resolution of Lindley’s paradox as the
relative belief ratio can be large and ORS small without contradiction. See Example 4 of Baskurt
and Evans (2013) and note that Evans (1997) shows that ORS converges to the classical p-value
as the prior becomes more diffuse in this example.
1.2. Posterior distribution of the Likelihood Ratio (PLR). Let’s focus again on the sim-
ple vs composite hypothesis test. Contrary to the posterior predictive p-value, the Posterior
distribution of the Likelihood Ratio (PLR) does not integrate over some data which are unob-
served, but only integrates over Θ. It still conditions upon the only observed variable, namely x0,
like for the BF, but on a domain defined from a divergence variable, like the posterior predictive
p-value. This statistic proposed by Dempster (1973) is defined by
(4) PLR(x, ζ) = Pr
(
LR(x, θ) ≤ ζ∣∣x)
where LR(x, .) is the Likelihood Ratio
LR(x, θ) =
p(x|θ0)
p(x|θ) θ ∈ Θ1
Since θ is random, the deterministic function LR(x, .) evaluated at the random variable θ
becomes naturally random with some posterior distribution characterized by its cumulative dis-
tribution, the PLR. As emphasized by Birnbaum (1962), Dempster (1973) and Royall (1997),
the threshold ζ which compares the original likelihoods under H0 and under H1 is directly in-
terpretable and can be chosen the same way an error level α is chosen in the Neyman-Pearson
paradigm. “PLR(x, 1) = 0.1” for example reads “The probability that the likelihood of θ1 is
more than the likelihood of θ0 is 0.1.”.
The PLR can therefore be used for a binary decision, by fixing ζ and deciding to reject H0 if
PLR(x, ζ) is greater than, say, 0.9. One can check if the binary decision is sensitive to the choice
of both thresholds by making the test for several thresholds and see if the decision is different.
In the extreme case, note that due to the nice definition of the PLR, one can simply display
PLR(x, ζ) as a function of ζ to get a broad view. The range of ζ under which PLR(x, ζ) grows
typically from 0.2 to 0.8 indicates if the decision for H0 or H1 is clear, or not. As soon as the
posterior can be sampled, these computations and graphs are very easy to display as will be
explained later.
The PLR has been first proposed by Dempster (1973, 1997), then studied especially by Aitkin
(1997) and Aitkin (2010) but also used and analyzed by Aitkin et al. (2005, 2009). As mentioned
in the previous subsection, it turns out that the PLR is also closely related to the ORS proposed
by Evans (1997), which generalizes the PLR. The PLR is also closely related to the e-value
associated to the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) from Pereira and Stern (1999) and
slightely revisited by Borges and Stern (2007) which then somehow generalizes the PLR by
adding a reference distribution on θ, and by systematically dealing with the case where the null
hypothesis domain Θ0 has a dimension less than Θ1 but which is not necessarily restricted to
the point Θ0 = {θ0}. We do not list the results found by these different analyses, apart from
some specifically mentioned ones.
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The PLR turns out to be a natural Bayesian measure of evidence of the studied hypotheses
since it involves only the posterior distribution of θ (no integral over X ) and the likelihood,
claimed by Birnbaum (1962), Royall (1997) and others, to be the only tool that can measure
evidence. Unlike the BF, the PLR is well defined for an improper prior as soon as the posterior
is proper, and is not subject to Lindley’s paradox. It is also invariant under any isomorphic
transformation of the X space and any transformation of the Θ space, as a consequence of being
a mere function of the likelihood. These last properties were emphasized for example for the
e-value associated to the FBST.
The PLR also consists in a natural alternative to the BF in different regards. To start with,
the PLR first compares (compares p(x|θ0) and p(x|θ)) and then integrates, whereas the BF first
integrates and then compares (compares p(x|θ0) and
∫
dθ p(x|θ)pi(θ)). Second, Newton and
Raftery (1994) and many others show that if the prior under H1 is proper, the BF is simply the
posterior mean of the LR, ie the mean of the distribution described by the PLR2. However a
point estimate is in general not given alone but accompanied by an uncertainty indicator. Smith
and Ferrari (2010) show that the posterior mean of the LR raised at some power is equal to
the FBF introduced previously; the mean of the PLR is given by the BF and its variance is
easily related to the FBF. However, Smith (2010) shows that the Generalized Likelihood Ratio
bounds the support (values of ζ(x) for which PLR(x, ζ) > 0) of the PLR and that at this lower
bound the PLR in general starts by an infinite derivative. In addition to this theoretical result,
numerical examples also indicate that the posterior density function of the LR is in general highly
asymmetric. Therefore, the BF (point estimate of the LR) or any standard centered credible
intervals do not appear to be relevant inferences about the LR seen as random variable. Instead,
the same way the BF is to be thresholded, the actual information about LR(x, θ) which seems
to be relevant, and invariant under the transformation LR(x, θ) 7→ (LR(x, θ))−1, is to indicate
its cumulative posterior distribution, which is precisely the PLR.
In practice, the PLR can be straightforwardly computed as soon as the posterior distribution
pi(θ|x) is sampled. Just obtain from a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm an almost
i.i.d. chain {θ[1], ..., θ[m]} from the posterior distribution pi(θ|x) and compute LR(x, θ[i]) for each
sample. The resulting histogram sketches the posterior density of the LR and the plot of the
empirical cumulative distribution of the LR chain sketches the PLR as a function of ζ.
The PLR has been realistically and thouroughly applied by Smith (2010) to the detection of
extra-solar planets from images acquired with the dedicated instrument SPHERE mounted on
the Very Large Telescope. At this moment, only very finely simulated images were available.
The PLR has been applied to two simulated datasets, one in which no extra-solar planet is
present (dataset simulated under H0) and the other in which an extra-solar planet is present
(H1 dataset). Although the extra-solar planet is very dark (106 times less bright than the star it
surrounds), close to the star (angular distance in the sky of 0.2 arcseconds i.e. 6.10−5 degrees),
and although only 2× 20 images were used, thanks to the quality of the optical instruments and
of the statistical model the detection and not detection were evident, with PLR(x, 0.1) = 0.0 for
the dataset under H0 and PLR(x, 0.1) = 0.94 for the dataset under H1. As studied by Smith
(2010), the statistical model and consecutive method are very satisfying compared to classical
methods.
1.3. Problematics addressed here. Despite its potential interest the PLR has not been ex-
tensively studied up to now. This paper aims at contributing in this investigating work by some
new results.
In the simple vs composite hypotheses test case, it turns out that the PLR plays a strong
role in understanding the possible reconciliation between frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis
testing. The PLR with inner threshold ζ = 1 is simply equal to some frequentist p-value for
some “likelihood - prior - hypotheses” combinations. Dempster (1973); Aitkin (1997) have first
2Alternatively, note that if we had defined the BF and LR with the alternative hypothesis at the numerator
of these fractions, the BF would have been the prior mean of the LR.
GENERALIZATIONS RELATED TO THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION OF THE LR 5
noticed and highlighted this equivalence when testing the mean of a gaussian likelihood with a
uniform prior.
In the section 2, we extend the conditions of this equivalence result under a frame analogous
to the one used to reconcile confidence and credible domains. The subsection 2.1 synthesizes the
long quest of reconciliation between frequentist and Bayesian hypotheses tests, the subsection 2.2
proves and discusses the reconciliation reached between the PLR and some frequentist p-value in
such an invariant frame, the subsection 2.3 gives examples and perspectives, and the subsection
2.4 discusses the connection between this reconciliation result and the one obtained between
(frequentist) confidence domains and (Bayesian) credible regions.
Aitkin (1997) and Aitkin (2010) extended the PLR definition to an hypotheses test frame
identical to the one presented at the end of the subsection 1.1, namely H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0, also
considered by Evans (1997) and others. However, the PLR has not been yet generalized to the
general composite vs composite hypotheses test. The generalization is somehow unnatural for
a frequentist p-value because for a simple hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 the p-value is a frequentist
probability conditioned on the fixed parameter θ0 (see equation 2), although a conditional prob-
ability cannot be defined on a composite set Θ0 if no probability distribution over Θ is used. By
contrast, the PLR is reciprocally a probability conditioned upon the observed dataset x0, and
x0 naturally remains fixed under a composite hypothesis. Therefore, the transition from simple
to composite null hypothesis does not raise immediate obstacles for the PLR. However, a joint
measure on the parameter spaces of both hypotheses is still required.
The section 3 proposes and motivates two generalizations of the PLR. The mathematical
expressions of the two extensions are simply given and rephrased in the subsection 3.1. The
first extension in particular enables the use of improper priors as soon as the posterior is proper.
It can therefore be used in the subsection 3.2 for the detection of precipitation change where
an almost improper prior is to be used but leads to a proper posterior. On the other side, the
second extension, made of two symmetrical probabilities, appears in a Bayesian version of the
Neyman-Pearson lemma. As detailed in the subsection 3.3, the two joint measures associated to
no specific discrepancy variable lead through the lemma to the discrepancy variable LR(x0, θ).
A concluding discussion is proposed in the section 4. The appendices essentially present the
proofs of the mathematical results.
2. Equivalence between the PLR and a frequentist p-value
2.1. Previous tentative reconciliations of frequentist and Bayesian tests. As introduced
in the section 1.1, Lindley’s paradox presents a frame where Pr(H0|x) (often thought as being
the Bayesian measure of evidence) may be expected to be equal to the frequentist p-value, but
happens not to be. Also, the BF is not satisfying in the frame “point null hypothesis H0 and
diffuse prior pi1”. This highlights the need for other Bayesian-type hypotheses tests, but also
raises more generally the question of reconciliation between frequentist and Bayesian hypotheses
tests.
The conditions upon which frequentist (Neyman (1977)) and Bayesian (Jeffreys (1961)) an-
swers agree is always of interest in order to understand the interpretation of the procedures and
the limits of the two paradigms, somehow defined by what they are not.
A first approach to see when could frequentist and Bayesian hypotheses tests be unified consists
of analyzing, for different hypotheses likelihoods and priors, when are the classical p-value and
Pr(H0|x) equal. These two concepts are to be compared because they both seem to handle only
H0 and in very simple ways, one from the frequentist the other from the Bayesian perspectives3.
It turns out that unlike for a composite null hypothesis (e.g. Casella and Berger (1987)), for a
point null hypothesis Lindley’s paradox Pr(H0|x) > pval(x) always seems to hold. Berger and
Sellke (1987) in particular show that among very broad classes of priors Pr(H0|x) > pval(x) always
holds for Pr(H0) = 0.5. Also see the extensive list of references included. Oh and DasGupta
(1999) follows this analysis by studying the effect of the choice of Pr(H0).
3Note however that H1 is implicitely taken into account through the marginal distribution of x in Pr(H0|x).
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Another approach consists of modifying the standard frequentist procedure and/or the stan-
dard Bayesian hypotheses test procedure, but still relying on the p-value and Pr(H0|x), to see
if they can then be made equivalent. Berger and Delampady (1987) for example study “precise”
(concentrated) but not exactly “point” hypotheses, Berger et al. (1994) use frequentist p-values
computed from a likelihood conditioned upon a set in which lies the observed dataset, not on the
dataset itself, and define a non-decision domain in the BF test procedure. Sellke et al. (2001)
advocate calibrating (rescaling) the frequentist p-value to relate this new statistic to other test
statistics.
As already mentioned in the section 1.1, one can also try to unify the p-value to Bayesian type
statistics fully different from the BF, to see when frequentist and Bayesian types hypotheses
tests can be made equivalent. In particular, when Dempster (1973) proposed to use the PLR,
he also mentioned that when testing the mean of a normal distribution, the PLR is equal to the
classical frequentist p-value when computed for a uniform prior and with inner parameter ζ = 1.
This fundamental result was again emphasized by Aitkin (1997) and Dempster (1997).
Aitkin (1997) asymptotically extended this result to any regular distribution, making use of the
asymptotic convergence of a regular distribution towards a normal distribution. For any regular
continuous distribution and a smooth prior, the PLR, with ζ = 1, tends asymptotically to the
classical p-value. Also, with a nuisance parameter η and still calling θ the tested parameter, he
defines LR by LR(x, θ, η) = p(x|θ0, η)/p(x|θ, η), in which case under the same conditions as in
the previous case the PLR is equal to a p-value. For a normal distribution, when testing the
mean and considering the variance as a nuisance parameter, the result is also true for a finite
sample.
2.2. New reconciliation result. The sets of conditions found by Dempster (1973) and Aitkin
(1997) under which the PLR (with ζ = 1) is equal to a p-value are directly related to the test
of the mean of a normal distribution under a uniform prior. The next subsection generalizes
this exact finite-sample result under the frame of statistical invariance. As will be discussed at
the end of the section, although the technical conditions derived here may be relaxed, it may
be difficult to find, at least within the current statistical frame, a fundamentally more general
frame of conditions for an equality between the PLR and a p-value to hold.
As presented in current classical textbooks in Bayesian statistics (Berger (1985), Robert
(2007)), invariance in statistics arises from the invariant Haar measure defined on some topolog-
ical group. Throughout this subsection and the related appendices, we will use the notions and
results synthesized by Nachbin (1965) and Eaton (1989). The tools necessary to understand the
result are introduced in the appendix 1.
In this frame, the PLR (given by an integral over the parameter space Θ) can be reexpressed
as an integral over the sample space X , equal to a p-value for ζ = 1. In this subsection x and θ
denote random variables or variables of integration according to the context.
First, for clarity, we give the equivalence between the PLR and a frequentist integral under
the assumption that the sample space X , the parameter space Θ and the transformations group
G are isomorphic.
Theorem 1. Call PΘ = {p(.|θ), θ ∈ Θ} a family of probability densities with respect to the
Lebesgue measure on X , and call G a group acting on X . Assume that PΘ is invariant under the
action of the group G on X and note g¯θ the induced action of the element g ∈ G on the element
θ ∈ Θ. Call Hr and H l respectively a right and left Haar measures of G and assume that
(1) G, X and Θ are isomorphic.
(2) The prior measure Πr is the measure induced by Hr on Θ.
(3) The measure induced by H l on X is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. Call pil the corresponding density.
(4) The marginal density of x is finite, so that the posterior measure Πrx on Θ, classically
defined by the equation (23), defines the posterior probability Pr(.|x0).
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Then, the PLR defined by the equation (4) can be reexpressed for any ζ > 0 as the frequentist
integral:
PLR(x0, ζ) = Pr
(
p(x0|θ0)
pil(x0)
≤ ζ p(x|θ0)
pil(x)
| θ0
)
(5)
where x0 ∈ X is the observed data and θ0 ∈ Θ the parameter value under the null hypothesis.
A more general theorem (Theorem 2) derived in a frame which avoids the Lebesgue assumption
and may involve more technical conditions is proved in Appendix 2. Theorem 1 is a consequence
of Theorem 2 and its proof is given in Appendix 3.
The assumption that G and X are isomorphic is easily relaxed by replacing the sample space
by the space of a sufficient statistic. Recall that if X is a random variable whose probability
distribution is parametrized by θ, S(X) is called a sufficient statistic of θ if the probability
distribution of X conditioned upon the random variable S(X) does not depend on θ. Note
that according to the Darmois (1935) theorem, among families of probability distributions whose
domains do not vary with the parameter being estimated, only in exponential families is there a
sufficient statistic whose dimension remains bounded as the sample size increases.
The expression of the theorem 2 is simply extended by replacing X by a sufficient statistic
S(X) in the assumptions and by replacing in the frequentist integral the probability density of
X by the one of S(X):
Corollary 1. Call PΘ = {p(.|θ), θ ∈ Θ} a family of probability densities with respect to any
measure on X . Call S(X), for X ∈ X , a sufficient statistic of θ and PS,Θ = {pS(.|θ), θ ∈ Θ}
the family of probability densities of S(X) with respect to the Lebesgue measure on S(X ). Call
G a group acting on S(X ). Assume that PS,Θ is invariant under the action of the group G on
S(X ) and note g¯θ the induced action of the element g ∈ G on the element θ ∈ Θ. Call Hr and
H l respectively any right and left Haar measures of G. Assume that
(1) G, S(X ) and Θ are isomorphic.
(2) The prior measure Πr is the measure induced by Hr on Θ.
(3) The measure induced by H l on S(X ) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. Call pil the corresponding density.
(4) The marginal density of x is finite, so that the posterior measure Πrx on Θ, classically
defined by the equation (23), defines the posterior probability Pr(.|x0).
Then, the PLR defined by the equation (4) can be reexpressed, with x0 ∈ X , θ0 ∈ Θ and ζ > 0,
as the frequentist integral:
PLR(x0, ζ) = Pr
(
pS(S(x0)|θ0)
pil(S(x0))
≤ ζ pS(S(x)|θ0)
pil(S(x))
| θ0
)
(6)
where x0 ∈ X is the observed data and θ0 ∈ Θ the parameter value under the null hypothesis.
The proof follows the proof of the theorem 1 in the Appendix 3.
By evaluating ζ = 1 in the result, the PLR with ζ = 1 is easily and finally shown to be equal
to a frequentist p-value, where the test statistic is a weighted marginal likelihood of the sufficient
statistic S(x).
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of the corollary 1, the PLR with inner threshold ζ = 1 is
equal to a p-value:
(7) PLR(x0, 1) = pval
(
T (x0)
)
with the test statistic
(8) T (x) =
pS(S(x)|θ0)
pil(S(x))
The corollary 2 can be reexpressed as the fact that under the invariance assumptions, rejecting
H0 when PLR(x0, 1) > p is equivalent to rejecting H0 when pval
(
T (x0)
)
> p where the p-value
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is based on the idea of rejecting H0 when T (x0) defined in equation (8) (observed weigthed
likelihood under H0) is not large enough.
2.3. Examples and perspective. Dempster (1973) has shown that the PLR is equal to the
classical p-value associated to the test statistic T (x) = |x¯ − θ0| when testing the mean of a
normal family for X with a uniform prior on Θ. The corollary 2 extends this result since the
normal family is one of the distributions invariant under translation when testing the location
parameter, the uniform prior (i.e. Lebesgue measure) is the measure induced from the right
Haar measure associated to translation, and the test statistic T (.) is a monotone function of
pS(S(.)|θ0)pil(S(.))−1 since the translation (sum) is commutative, so that ∆(g) = 1 for all g ∈ G
and so pil is constant.
The result proved here concerns all distributions invariant under some group transformation,
under the assumptions that there exists a sufficient statistic and that the sets G, S(X ) and Θ
are isomorphic. Assume for example that the likelihood pS has the typical form pS(S(x)|θ) =
θ−1f
(
S(x)θ−1
)
. The likelihood is invariant under the scale transformation g(S(x)) = α × S(x)
and the actions on S(X ) and Θ are identical. Note that Uf(U) with U = S(X)θ−1 is a pivotal
quantity, meaning that its distribution does not depend on θ. The induced prior measure is
classically given by Πr(dθ) ∝ θ−1dθ. Since the multiplication transformation is commutative,
the modulus ∆ is uniformly equal to 1, so that the test statistic that appears in the p-value
(corollary 2) is simply T (x) = S(x)θ−10 f
(
S(x)θ−10
)
where θ0 is the value of the parameter under
H0. For a more general insight into the relationship between Haar invariance and the Fisher
pivotal theory, see Eaton and Sudderth (1999).
The theorem 2 assumes that G, X and Θ are isomorphic. This assumption is relaxed in
the corollaries 1 and 2 where the sample X is replaced by a sufficient statistic S(X): G, S(X )
and Θ are assumed to be isomorphic. This trick is one of the two classical dimensionality
reduction techniques concerning Haar measures applied to statistical problems and somehow
restricts the likelihood to belong to the exponential family from Darmois theorem. The second
trick consists schematically in replacing S(X ) by the orbit of G associated to the observed dataset
Ox0 = {gx0 | g ∈ G} ⊂ X . However, the whole set of assumptions that would be involved is
more technical, see for example the general assumptions made by Zidek (1969) or Eaton and
Sudderth (2002), and not investigated here.
2.4. Connection to other Bayesian and frequentist reconcilations. The result, which
concerns hypothesis testing, may be related to the different approaches used to reconcile fre-
quentist and Bayesian point estimation somehow and confidence interval especially.
Group invariance applied to invariant inference is the classical frame of such unifications. The
Fisherian pivotal theory (Fisher (1956)) is an important contribution mainly to the “frequentist”
side and the right Haar measure to the “Bayesian” side. The reconciliation of the two approaches
has started with Fraser (1961) and has been deeply studied since then, by Zidek (1969) for
example. The most general stage of unification is reached by Eaton and Sudderth (1999). They
explicit the central hypothesis of the Fisherian pivotal theory and show under quite standard
assumptions in invariance that this hypothesis leads to a procedure which is identical to the
Bayesian invariant procedure when using the prior induced by the right Haar measure. Note
that they also show (and in a more general manner by Eaton and Sudderth (2002)) that for a
Bayesian invariant inference to be admissible (in the sense that there exists no invariant inference
whose mean quadratic error is lower for all θ) it has to be obtained from the right Haar prior.
More concretely, the question related to reconciled probability domains is: “Under what as-
sumptions does the following equality hold?”
Pr
(
θ ∈ R(x)∣∣x) = Pr(θ ∈ R(x)∣∣θ)(9)
i.e.
∫
{θ∈R(x)}
dθ pi(θ|x) =
∫
{x|θ∈R(x)}
dx p(x|θ)
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For the equality to hold, each probability needs to be a constant. After Fraser (1961) initial
work, Stein (1965) sketched the first conditions of what would be called later Stein’s theorem for
invariant domains. The part which is common to the different “Stein’s theorems” is the following:
If a domain R(x) ⊂ Θ satisfies g¯R(x) = R(g(x)) with g¯R(x) = {g¯θ | θ ∈ R(x)},
then under [some invariance assumptions],
Pr
(
θ ∈ R(x)∣∣x) = c ∀x ∈ X (Bayesian probability)
and Pr
(
θ ∈ R(x)∣∣θ) = c ∀θ ∈ Θ (frequentist probability)
One of the simplest set of assumptions found since Stein (1965) is the one of Chang and Villegas
(1986). It is relatively close to the one used for our results, presented in the section 2.2.
Our result, mainly holding in the theorem 1, is not a consequence of Stein’s theorem because
the domainR(x) ⊂ Θ is not invariant in our case. R(x) would be invariant only if θ0 was invariant
under the transformations group G, i.e. if g¯θ0 = θ0 for all g¯ (this is equivalent to assuming that
H0 is invariant under G). But in the theorem 2, expressed and proved in the appendix 2 and used
in the appendix 3 to prove the theorem 1, φθ is assumed to be one-to-one for all θ ∈ Θ, which
implies that g¯θ0 = θ0 is equivalent to g¯ = e (identity function). So the domain R(x) ⊂ Θ is not
invariant in our case and Stein’s theorem does not imply the reconciliation result presented in
the section 2.2.
The theorem 1 does not answer the previous question, but rather relaxes the form of the
domain and accepts a procedure that varies according to the observed dataset x0 and the value
of the parameter θ0 under H0. It answers to the question: “Under what assumptions and for
what domains R and C does the following equality hold?”∫
R(x0,θ0)⊂Θ
dθ pi(θ|x0) =
∫
C(x0,θ0)⊂X
dx p(x|θ0)(10)
The domains found take the form
R(x0, θ0) = {θ | p(x0|θ0) ≤ p(x0|θ)}
C(x0, θ0) = {x | p(x0|θ0)f(x0) ≤ p(x|θ0)f(x)}
where f(x) is some weighting function, actually given by the inverse of the left prior induced by
the underlying group.
3. PLR for composite vs composite hypotheses testing
Up to this section, the PLR has been only defined in the simple (H0 : θ = θ0) vs composite
case, ie according to Dempster (1973)’s first definition.
For the more general hypothesis H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0 presented at the end of the section 1.1, Demp-
ster’s approach has been generalized by Aitkin (1997), with a modification presented by Aitkin
(2010). Namely, Aitkin (2010) proposes to compute Pr
(
p(x|θ) < p (x|(Ψ,Λ)−1(ψ0,Λ(θ))) ∣∣x)
and details and illustrates some advantages of the method. In the case of Ψ(θ) = θ, it corre-
sponds to Dempster’s definition (see page 42 of Aitkin (2010)). The approach of Evans (1997)
also carries interesting properties. In particular, a variety of optimality properties for inferences
based on relative belief ratios are established in Evans et al. (2006), Evans and Shakhatreh (2008)
and Evans and Jang (2011), which include optimal testing properties based on establishing a kind
of Bayesian version of the Neyman-Pearson lemma.
However, the hypotheses test case on which they rely is not broad enough for many cases.
The purpose of this section is to extend the definition of the PLR to the classical composite vs
composite hypotheses test.
Suppose the data models related to the two hypotheses belong to the same parametric family
PΘ = {p(.|θ), θ ∈ Θ}. This assumption can actually be realized for any hypotheses test of
parametric models by merging the tested parametric families in a so-called super-model. A
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composite vs composite hypotheses test consists in choosing among
H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 H1 : θ ∈ Θ1(11)
for any domains Θ0 and Θ1. We note Π0(.) and Π1(.) the prior distributions over Θ0 and Θ1.
In this section we propose two extensions of Dempster’s approach for this test case. The
first extension proposed can be used when the prior under one hypothesis is improper but both
posteriors are proper. The second extension, made of two symmetrical probabilities, is the
statistics suggested by a new Bayesian-type Neyman-Pearson lemma which also indicates that
the LR is a central discrepancy variable.
3.1. Extensions of the PLR. In the simple Θ0 = {θ0} vs composite hypotheses test, the PLR
was primarly defined as
PLR(x, ζ) =
∫
{θ1|p(x|θ1)<ζp(x|θ0)}
Π1(dθ1|x)
In the composite vs composite hypotheses test, a first interesting extension of this concept
consists in defining the following statistics:
PLR01(x, ζ) =
∫
{(θ0,θ1)|p(x|θ0)<ζp(x|θ1)}
Π0(dθ1|x)Π1(dθ0|x)(12)
It is well defined as soon as the posterior distributions are both proper. Since only x is known,
the event p(x|θ0) < ζp(x|θ1) can be measured only by integrating over all θ0 ∈ Θ0 and all θ1Θ1.
Here we decide to measure it according to the posterior distribution of θ0 times the posterior
distribution of θ1, which is perfectly allowed.
A second interesting extension of the simple PLR consists in defining the two symmetrical
following statistics:
PLR0(x, ζ) =
∫
{(θ0,θ1)|p(x|θ1)<ζp(x|θ0)}
Π0(dθ0|x)Π1(dθ1)(13)
PLR1(x, ζ) =
∫
{(θ0,θ1)|p(x|θ0)<ζp(x|θ1)}
Π1(dθ1|x)Π0(dθ0)(14)
In the simple vs composite test, note that only PLR01(x, ζ) and PLR1(x, ζ) are equal to
the PLR as defined by Dempster (1973) and can thus be considered as extensions of the PLR.
However, given the symmetry of the two hypotheses in a composite vs composite test, the
notation PLR0(x, ζ) will be also necessary in the sequel.
Each quantity has its own definition, interpretation, properties and field of use. We don’t
investigate interpretation far here, and rather focus on unquestionable properties and results.
PLR01(x, ζ) is the only extension of the two which allows for using improper priors. It will
be illustrated in the next subsection to test a practical precipitation change, which requires the
use of a prior which is too smooth for the other extension to be used.
On the other side, the statistics PLR1(x, 1) is the expectation over the prior under H0 of the
posterior probability under H1 that the likelihood of θ0 is less than the likelihood of θ1, and
reciprocally.
PLR1(x, ζ) = E0[Pr1(p(x|θ0) < ζp(x|θ1)|x)]
PLR0 and PLR1 will appear as statistics emerging from a more general frame through a
Bayesian-type Neyman-Pearson lemma.
Extending the interpretation of the new PLRs in terms of joint probabilities requires the
definition of a measure over Θ0 × Θ1 given x and one of the two hypotheses. Such a measure
seems to make sense in terms of both mathematics and interpretation but the issue needs to be
deepened.
Remark 1. If all subsets defined on the sets Θ0 × X|H0 and Θ1|H0 are independent, then the
joint measure Π01,0 defined over Θ0 ×Θ1 ×X|H0 is equal to:
Π01,0(dθ0, dθ1|x) = Π0(dθ0|x)Π1(dθ1)
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Figure 1. Log-likelihood of the dataset under H0 (left figure) and the dataset
under H1(center and right figures). Some frequentist estimations of the parame-
ters (circles) are superimposed on the true parameters values (diamond).
for infinitesimal subsets around any (θ0, θ1) ∈ Θ0×Θ1. The same holds when replacing the roles
of H0 and H1, and leads to the measure Π01,1:
Π01,1(dθ0, dθ1|x) = Π0(dθ0)Π1(dθ1|x)
The proof of the remark stands in the appendix 4. So if we assume that the joint measures
exist and that the priors and posteriors are all proper, then the composite PLRs defined in the
equations (13) and (14) are probability measures.
3.2. Example: detection of a change in precipitation in Switzerland. Let’s illustrate
PLR01 defined in the equation (12).
Although the change in temperature in the 20th century is evident at a world scale and in
some areas, a potential change in precipitation remains under study. As a simple case, let’s
consider a single weather station in Switzerland and test whether the statistical properties of the
rain frequency have changed.
As recalled for example by Aksoy (2000), daily precipitation amounts are well described by
a gamma distribution, characterized by a shape parameter a and a rate parameter b. Assume
the daily rainfalls x1 fallen during the five first automns of the 20th century are i.i.d. with
parameters a1 and b1, as well as x2 during the five last automns with parameters a2 and b2. The
detection of a statistical change consists in testing whether the set of parameters are equal or
not:
H0 : (a1, b1) = (a2, b2) H1 : (a1, b1) 6= (a2, b2)(15)
Note that the dimension of Θ0 = R2+∗ is less than the dimension of Θ1 = R4+∗, so that
for a regular prior under H1, Pr1(θ ∈ Θ0) = 0. Borges and Stern (2007) are particularly
interested by the behavior of the e-value of the FBST in such cases. Here it simply means that
there is one prior pi(a, b) under H0 and the product of two priors pi(a1, b1) × pi(a2, b2) under
H1, to be combined respectively with the likelihood p(x1, x2|a, b) under H0 and the likelihood
p(x1|a1, b1)× p(x2|a2, b2) under H1.
To enable simple simulations of the posterior distributions under both hypotheses, the conju-
gate prior (see the compedium by Fink (1997)) of the gamma distribution developed by Miller
(1980) is used for pi, with hyperparameters that may vary without affecting much the final results.
The impact of the prior on the PLR is easy to see from the PLR display as will be explained very
shortly. In practice, the prior pi is almost improper so that only the PLR01 defined in equation
(12) can be used.
First, simulations roughly corresponding to the observed rainfall are performed. One dataset
is simulated under H0 and another is simulated under some reasonably similar alternative H1.
The two simulated datasets are characterized by their likelihoods, displayed on the figure 1.
The posterior distribution of each couple (a, b), (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) is separately sampled by
a MCMC multivariate slice sampling algorithm (Radford (2003)) implemented in the R package
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Figure 2. PLR obtained from the dataset simulated under H0 (left) and the
dataset simulated under H1 (right). In practice those are simply the empirical
cumulative distributions of the LR(x, θ[i]) chains. For the H0 dataset the PLR
clearly correctly accepts H0, and reciprocally for the H1 dataset the PLR clearly
correctly rejects H0: notice the difference of the x axes scales between both sim-
ulation cases.
“SamplerCompare” kindly written and provided by Thompson (2012). The PLR is simply com-
puted by ordering the LR obtained for all possible combinations of parameters and counting the
fraction which is less than some threshold ζ chosen according to the level of evidence wanted
in favor of H0 or H1. In practice, the PLR is displayed as a function of ζ by simply displaying
the empirical cumulative distribution of the LRs. This leads to the figure 2. It can be read
for example that for the dataset under H0, PLR01(x, 0.1) = 0.08, which means that there is
an almost null probability that the likelihood under H1 is more than 10 times greater than the
likelihood under H0, so that H0 is (correctly) clearly accepted. Alternatively, for the H1 dataset,
PLR01(x, 0.1) = 1.00, meaning that there is a probabity one that the likelihood under H1 is more
than 10 times greater than the likelihood under H0, so that H0 is (correctly) clearly rejected.
Note that since the GLR indicates the lower bound of the support of the PLR and since the
slope of the PLR is infinite there if the likelihood function is smooth enough at its maximum (see
section 1.2), the prior exact expression only affects the way PLR01(x, ζ) increases as ζ departs
from GLR(x). Here for example the choice of the hyperparameters (among a domain considered
as reasonable) does not change the conclusion that would be drawn from the PLR displayed on
the figure 2.
Switching to the true dataset x, the PLR is obtained following the same procedure as with
the simulated datasets. PLR01(x, ζ) is displayed on the figure 3. The graph is –by construction
of the simulations– very similar the one obtained for the graph obtained with the data simulated
under H0. Now, PLR01(x, 0.1) = 0.10 and H0 can clearly not be rejected, so that no change in
the 20th precipitation in Switzerland is detected, which is not surprising to climatologists.
3.3. Bayesian type Neyman-Pearson lemma. In the choice of an hypothesis, instead of
considering the subset
(16) R∗(x) = {(θ0, θ1) | p(x|θ0) < ζp(x|θ1)}
one might consider any subset R(x) ⊂ Θ0 × Θ1, that may depend on x. Such a subset could
involve a discrepancy variable D : X ×Θ 7→ R like in the predictive p-value highlighted by Meng
(1994), and take the form “D(x, θ0) < ζD(x, θ1)”. The discrepancy variable that appears in the
PLR is LR(x, θ).
R∗(x) defined from the LR test is interesting for hypotheses testing because this set is a
somehow classical hypothesis rejection set. It is not a fully classical rejection set because it is
defined on the parameter space rather than on the observation space, but its characterization
GENERALIZATIONS RELATED TO THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION OF THE LR 13
Figure 3. PLR obtained from daily automnal precipitation observed in a
weather station in Switzerland from 1900-1905 for the first part of the dataset
and 1995-2000 for the second part of the dataset. H0 cannot be rejected, so that
no change in precipitation is detected.
is optimal in the frequentist setting. R∗(x) is the set, depending on the dataset x, of all fixed
(θ0, θ1) ∈ Θ0×Θ1 such that the likelihood of θ0 is less than the likelihood of θ1, which reasonably
leads to reject H0 for this element (θ0, θ1). The same way, one can replace the LR test by any
test, ie consider any subset R(x) ⊂ Θ0 ×Θ1 such that for (θ0, θ1) ∈ R(x), H0 would be decided
to be rejected.
With such a phrasing, it may appear natural that the frequentist Neyman-Pearson lemma can
be derived in a reciprocal, somehow Bayesian, frame. Note that the Neyman-Pearson lemma
can be expressed, as will be the proposition here, symmetrically in the two hypotheses. The
symmetry is only broken when adopting the Neyman paradigm which fixes a level for the PFA
and deduce the corresponding ζ (see section 1.1).
To rederive a Neyman-Pearson lemma one would define the reciprocal notions of “Probability
of False Alarm” and “Probability of good Detection”:
PFAB(R, x) =
∫
R(x)
Π0(dθ0|x)Π1(dθ1)(17)
PDB(R, x) =
∫
R(x)
Π1(dθ1|x)Π0(dθ0)(18)
These quantities would also define probability measures if the joint measures exist and if the
priors and posteriors are all proper.
Note that these measures can be related to a joint measure with no conditioning over the
hypothesis: for any set R(x) ⊂ Θ0 ×Θ1 eventually depending on x,
Pr(R, x) = Pr(H0) Pr(R|x,H0) + Pr(H1) Pr(R|x,H1)
with Pr(R|x,Hi) =
∫
R
Π01,i(dθ0, dθ1|Hi, x)
=
∫
R
Πi(dθi|x)Πj(dθj)
so Pr(R|x) = Pr(H0)
∫
R
Π0(dθ0|x)Π1(dθ1) + Pr(H1)
∫
R
Π1(dθ1|x)Π0(dθ0)
= Pr(H0) PFA0(R, x) + Pr(H1) PD1(R, x)
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The Bayesian type probabilities PFAB and PDB add up the same way type I and type II
probability errors add up in a frequentist integral. Note also that PFAB(R¯, x) = 1−PFAB(R, x)
where R¯(x) is the set complementary to R(x) in Θ0 ×Θ1.
Following the underlying idea of the Neyman-Pearson approach, a possibility for choosing
R(x) consists in maximizing PDB(R, x) over R(x) for a fixed PFAB(R, x).
Proposition 1. The subset that maximizes PDB(R, x) for a fixed value of PFAB(R, x) is equal
to the LR subset R∗(x) defined in equation (16). In this case, the “Bayesian PFA and PD” are
given by PFAB(R∗, x) = 1− PLR0(x, ζ) and PDB(R∗, x) = PLR1(x, ζ).
Reciprocally, the subset that maximizes PFAB(R, x) for a fixed value of PDB(R, x) is equal to
R¯∗(x), ie the set which accepts H0 according to the LR test. In this case, PFAB(R¯∗, x) =
PLR0(x, ζ) and PDB(R¯∗, x) = 1− PLR1(x, ζ).
As postdata measures (i.e. depending on the observed data), contrary to the predata frequen-
tist PFA and PD, it is therefore informative enough to give PLR0(x, ζ) and PLR1(x, ζ) for some
value ζ of interest. But this is only possible if the priors and posteriors under both hypotheses
are proper.
The proof of the proposition follows the proof of the Neyman-Pearson lemma restricted to
deterministic tests. It stands in the appendix 5.
4. Concluding general discussion about the PLR
The PLR introduced by Dempster (1973) in the simple vs composite hypotheses test deserves
much attention. It compares the original likelihoods p(x|θ0) and p(x|θ1) by computing the poste-
rior probability that this usual LR test chooses H0 or H1. The PLR is simple, nicely interpretable
and coupled with some deep properties. Compared to the classical Bayesian hypotheses tests,
first note that unlike the BF, the PLR can be defined even for improper priors, and unlike
Pr(H0|x) it does not require the delicate choice of some Pr(H0). This is crucial in practice as
well as in fundamental issues like Lindley’s paradox.
The PLR also turns out to be a very natural alternative to the BF in many aspects. The
PLR first compares (the original likelihoods) and then integrates, whereas the BF first integrates
and then compares (the marginal likelihoods). In the simple vs composite hypotheses test,
considering LR(x, θ) as a random variable for a fixed x, the PLR is its posterior cumulative
distribution (i.e. the probability of a one sided credible interval) whereas the BF is its posterior
mean point estimate. This credible interval vs point estimate duality between the PLR and
the BF also translates in decision theory: Hwang et al. (1992) stressed that Pr(H0|x) does not
measure evidence, since this is done only through the likelihood, but measures the accuracy of a
test by estimating the indicator function IΘ0(θ). Also note that being the measure of a credible
interval, the PLR is also a natural hypotheses test tool which connects postdata (i.e. conditioned
upon x) hypotheses testing and credible interval inference. This formal equivalence was known
to hold for predata inference (a rejection set is equivalent to a confidence interval) and “known”
not to hold for postdata inference for usual Bayesian tools (see Lehmann and Romano (2005)
and Goutis and Casella (1997)). Tools like the PLR set up this connection.
However, when generalizing the PLR in the section 3.1, most of these dual properties cannot
be generalized to the composite vs composite hypotheses test. Instead, a reciprocity between the
PLR and the BF exists through a Neyman-Pearson lemma perspective. The second extension
of the PLR has been shown in the section 3.3 to be a somehow optimal measure, in that it
measures the set that maximizes PDB for a fixed PFAB (Bayesian-type version of the frequentist
Neyman-Pearson lemma). Reciprocally, the BF gives a somehow optimal measure, although in
the frequentist Neyman-Pearson sense, in that it maximizes the average over pi1 of PD(θ1) for a
fixed PFA (frequentist classical Neyman-Pearson lemma but for the marginal likelihood and not
the original unknown one).
In the simple vs composite hypotheses test, the connection between the PLR (related to
credible interval) and the BF (related to point estimate) has been underlined. Another important
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connection lies between frequentist and Bayesian type hypotheses tests, namely frequentist p-
values and Pr(H0|x) or PLR. This reconciliation quest has been the subject of many debates,
including Lindley’s paradox in its most simple form (test of the mean of a Gaussian with a uniform
prior), which has only been simply reached by the PLR by Dempster (1973). In the section 2.2
we have generalized this reconciliation result to a quite general invariant frame, close to the
one used in Stein’s theorem, i.e. in a frame under which confidence and credible intervals are
equivalent. Note that invariance is also a perspective adopted to develop and evaluate inferences,
and in particular to develop new p-values as done recently by Evans and Jang (2010) for example.
For the PLR, standard simple invariance properties directly follows from the simple use of the
likelihoods.
To conclude on the contribution of this paper, the equivalence between the PLR and a p-value
has been proved in a general invariant frame, which nicely connects to the equivalence between
confidence and credible domains. This result may contribute to a better understanding of deep
and fundamental issues related to both hypotheses testing and parameter estimation, in both
frequentist and Bayesian paradigms.
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Appendix 1: Introduction to invariance in statistics
For a locally compact Hausdorff group G, K(G) denotes the class of all continuous real-valued
functions on G that have compact support. The left invariant Haar measure on G is defined as
a Radon measure H l such that for all f ∈ K(G) and all g0 ∈ G,∫
G
f(g)H l(dg) =
∫
G
f(g0g)H
l(dg)
The right invariant Haar measure Hr on G is defined as H l but replacing g0g by gg0. For a given
group, both Haar measures exist and are unique up to multiplicative constants.
The (right) modulus ∆ of G is the real positive valued function such that ifH l is a left invariant
Haar measure, then for all f ∈ K(G) and all g0 ∈ G,∫
f(gg−10 )H
l(dg) = ∆(g0)
∫
f(g)H l(dg)(19)
From the unicity of the Haar measure, ∆ does not depend on the choice of H l and is a continuous
function such that for all g1, g2 ∈ G, ∆(g1g2) = ∆(g1)∆(g2), which implies that ∆(g−1) =
∆(g)−1. Note that for a group G the set of all right Haar measures is equal to the set of the
left Haar measures if and only if ∆ is identically equal to 1. This occurs for example when G is
compact or commutative.
Concerning the Haar measures on the group G, the initial definitions and properties imply
that if H l is a left invariant Haar measure on G and ∆ the modulus of G then for all f ∈ K(G)∫
f(g−1)H l(dg) =
∫
f(g)∆(g)−1H l(dg)(20)
The modulus also enables to relate right and left invariant Haar measures. From the last property,
the measure defined by
Hr(dg) = ∆(g)−1H l(dg)(21)
is a right invariant Haar measure on G. The same way, if Hr is a right invariant Haar measure
on G, then the measure defined by H l(dg) = ∆(g)Hr(dg) is a left invariant Haar measure.
The Haar measure is applied to statistics through the concept of invariance of a data model
under a group of transformations. A parametric family PΘ =
{
p(.|θ), θ ∈ Θ} of densities with
respect to any measure µ on X is said to be invariant under the transformations group G if
for each g ∈ G there exists a unique θ∗ ∈ Θ such that if the distribution of X has the density
p(.|θ) ∈ PΘ then Y = gX has the density p(.|θ∗) ∈ PΘ. This property defines the action of G on
Θ: θ∗ may simply be denoted θ∗ = g¯θ where {g¯, g ∈ G} defines a group.
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A measure µ on X is said to be relatively invariant with multiplier χ under the group G if for
all f ∈ K(X ) and g ∈ G ∫
f(x)µ(dx) = χ(g)
∫
f(gx)µ(dx)(22)
If we assume that both the family of densities and the measure µ are respectively invariant and
relatively invariant, schematically we get p(x|θ) = χ(g)p(gx|gθ) for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ Θ and g ∈ G.
For more about the connection between such a multiplier and the Jacobian of the transformation
that leads to gx from x, see for example Berger (1985) or Eaton (2007). Note that the theorem
2 could be formulated differently, by defining the invariance of a probability model, but this
phrasing is less common than the invariance of a family of probability densities and this would
have entailed a longer presentation.
To shorten the preliminaries and without assuming any knowledge about group theory, we will
not refer to group properties like transitivity, orbits... and will concretely simply assume that
Θ and G are isomorphic. More precisely, we will assume that the transformation φθ : G 7→ Θ
with φθ(g) = gθ is one-to-one whatever θ ∈ Θ. The right Haar prior on Θ is to be induced
from the right Haar measure Hr on G and the action of G on Θ. From the frame chosen, the
right Haar prior Πra is simply defined by Πra = Hr(φ−1a ), with a ∈ Θ. As shown in Villegas
(1981), it turns out that the measure Πra actually does not depend on a. The induced prior is
therefore unique for a fixed Hr and noted Πr. Πr = Hr(φ−1a ) means that for any measurable
subset A ⊂ Θ, Πr(A) = Hr(φ−1a A) with φ−1a A = {φ−1a θ|θ ∈ A}. Note that a subset A = dθ
denotes an infinitesimal subset centered around θ, where θ is implicit. Πr can be normalized into
a probability measure if and only if the group G is compact, and in this case we can go back to
the usual notation Πr(A) = Pr(θ ∈ A) where the measure Πr is implicit in Pr(.).
Finally, from the data model density p(.|θ) and the prior Πr, the posterior measure Πrx on Θ
is classically defined by
Πrx(B) =
∫
B p(x|θ)Πr(dθ)
m(x)
for all B ⊂ Θ(23)
with m(x) =
∫
p(x|θ)Πr(dθ)
where the marginal m(x) density of x is always assumed to be finite, so that Πrx defines a
probability measure even if Πr does not. Then the posterior probability of an event is denoted
by Pr(.|x), meaning Pr(θ ∈ B|x) = Πrx(B).
Appendix 2: General theorem and its proof
Theorem 2. Call PΘ = {p(.|θ), θ ∈ Θ} a family of probability densities with respect to a measure
µr on X , specified later, and call G a group acting on X . Assume that PΘ is invariant under the
action of the group G on X and note g¯θ the induced action of the element g ∈ G on the element
θ ∈ Θ. Call Hr any right Haar measure of G and define the transformations φθ (for θ ∈ Θ) and
φx (for x ∈ X ) by
(24) φθ : G¯ 7→ Θ
g¯ 7→ g¯θ
φx : G 7→ X
g 7→ gx
Assume that
(1) φθ is one-to-one for all θ ∈ Θ and φx is one-to-one for all x ∈ X .
(2) The prior measure Πr on Θ is the measure induced by Hr via φθ and the measure µr on
X is the measure induced by Hr via φx: Πr = Hr(φ−1θ ) and µr = Hr(φ−1x ).
(3) The marginal density of x is finite, so that the posterior measure Πrx on Θ, classically
defined by the equation (23), defines the posterior probability Pr(.|x0).
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Then, the PLR defined by the equation (4) can be reexpressed, for any ζ > 0 and any c ∈ X , as
the frequentist integral:
PLR(x0, ζ) = Pr
(
p(x0|θ0)∆
(
φ−1x0 c
) ≤ ζ p(x|θ0)∆(φ−1x c) | θ0)(25)
where ∆ is the modulus of the group G, as defined in the equation (19), and in practice x0 ∈ X
is the observed data and θ0 ∈ Θ the parameter value under the null hypothesis.
Note that as seen in the previous appendix, the measures µ and Πr defined in the theorem 2
do not depend on the choice of θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ X in the functions φθ and φx. In order to clarify
the proof, we note a instead of x and b instead of θ in the following. We shall make use of the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. The measures µ on X and Πr on Θ induced above by the right Haar measure Hr on
G are relatively invariant with modulus ∆−1.
Proof.∫
f(g0x)µ(dx) =
∫
f(g0x)H
rφ−1a (dx) (Def. of µ in the Cond. of Th. 2)
=
∫
f
(
g0φag
)
Hr(dg) (transformation g = φ−1a x)
=
∫
f
(
g0ga
)
∆(g)−1H l(dg) (Def. of φa and prop. eq. (21))
= ∆(g0)
∫
f
(
g0ga
)
∆(g0g)
−1H l(dg) (Multiplicity prop. of ∆)
= ∆(g0)
∫
f(ga)∆(g)−1H l(dg) (H l left invariant)
= ∆(g0)
∫
f(x)µ(dx) (previous computation made in reverse order)
This also implies that a Haar prior induced as in the theorem 2, i.e. from a right invariant
Haar measure on G, is relatively invariant.
PLR(x0, ζ) = Pr
(
p(x0|θ0) ≤ ζp(x0|θ)
∣∣∣ x0)
=
1
m(x0)
∫{
θ|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(x0|θ)
} p(x0|θ)Πr(dθ)(26)
=
1
m(x0)
∫{
θ|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(x0|θ)
} p(x0|θ)Hr(φ−1b (dθ)) (Def. Πr in the Cond. of Th. 2)
=
1
m(x0)
∫{
g|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(x0|φbg)
} p(x0|φbg)Hr(dg) (g = φ−1b θ)
=
1
m(x0)
∫{
g|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(x0|gb)
} p(x0|gb)Hr(dg) (Def. φθ eq. (24))
=
1
m(x0)
∫{
g|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(x0|gb)
} p(x0|gb)∆(g)−1H l(dg) (Prop. eq. (21))
=
1
m(x0)
∫{
g|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(x0|g−1b)
} p(x0∣∣g−1b)H l(dg) (Prop. eq. (20))
But according to lemma 1, µ is relatively invariant with modulus ∆−1. Since the density
family is invariant,
p(x|θ) = ∆(g)−1p(gx|gθ) for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ Θ, g ∈ G
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i.e.
p(x|g−1θ′) = ∆(g)−1p(gx|θ′) for all x ∈ X , θ′ ∈ Θ, g ∈ G
Then,
PLR(x0, ζ) =
1
m(x0)
∫{
g:|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(gx0|b)∆(g)−1
}∆(g)−1p(gx0|b)H l(dg)
=
1
m(x0)
∫{
g|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(gx0|b)∆(g)−1
} p(gx0|b)Hr(dg) (Prop. eq. (21))
=
1
m(x0)
∫{
g|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(gx0|b)∆(g)−1
} p(gx0|b)µ(φa(dg)) (Def. µ)
It can be noticed that the equation (26) depends neither on a ∈ X nor on b ∈ Θ. Choose now
for simplicity a = x0. Then, making the transformation x = φx0g = gx0,
PLR(x0, ζ) =
1
m(x0)
∫{
x|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(x|b)∆
(
φ−1x0 x
)−1} p(x|b)µ(dx)
By a similar computation we get the expression of the marginal density of X evaluated at x0:
m(x0) =
∫
p(x0|θ)Πr(dθ) =
∫
p(x|b)µ(dx) = 1
The marginal density of X is constant, the same way the frequentist risk of an invariant estimator
does not depend on θ. So
PLR(x0, ζ) =
∫{
x|p(x0|θ0)≤ζp(x|b)∆
(
φ−1x0 x
)−1} p(x|b)µ(dx)
In order to get a form closer to a p-value, we choose from now b = θ0 and note that for any
c ∈ X ,
∆
(
φ−1x0 x
)
=
∆
(
φ−1c x
)
∆
(
φ−1c x0
)(27)
because if we note
g = φ−1x0 x
g1 = φ
−1
c x
g2 = φ
−1
c x0
then on one side gx0 = x and on the other g1(g−12 x0) = g1c = x so that
gx0 = (g1g
−1
2 )x0
so φx0g = φx0(g1g
−1
2 )
so g = g1g−12 (φa is one-to-one)
so ∆(g) =
∆(g1)
∆(g2)
(Prop. of ∆)
Finally, for any c ∈ X
PLR(x0, ζ) =
∫{
x| p(x0|θ0)
∆(φ−1c x0)
≤ζ p(x|θ0)
∆(φ−1c x)
} p(x|θ0)µ(dx)(28)
It is also interesting to note that
φ−1a b = (φ
−1
b a)
−1(29)
since g = φ−1a b⇒ ga = b⇒ a = g−1b⇒ g−1 = φ−1b a
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so that the same way we have
PLR(x0, ζ) =
∫{
x|p(x0|θ0)∆
(
φ−1x0 c
)
≤ζp(x|θ0)∆
(
φ−1x c
)} p(x|θ0)µ(dx)
= Pr
(
p(x0|θ0)∆
(
φ−1x0 c
) ≤ ζp(x|θ0)∆(φ−1x c)∣∣∣θ0)

Appendix 3: Proof of the theorem 1 and corollaries 1, 2
The theorem 1 is a corollary of the theorem 2 presented and proved in the previous appendix:
the theorem 2 can be reexpressed more simply by assuming that the likelihood family and the
induced Haar measures are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Proof of the theorem 1. The proof only consists of reexpressing the domains of integration be-
cause the integrands expression are not functions of the use of the decomposition of the measures
over some other measures (µ or Lesbesgue). The proof even actually only consists of reexpressing
the domain of integration of the p-value because the domain of integration of the PLR does not
depend on the density over X used since the domain of integration is a subset of Θ, not X .
If we note pµ(.|θ) the density with respect to the induced Haar measure µr and p(.|θ) the
density with respect to the Lebesgue measure, we have by definition
P (dx|θ) = pµ(x|θ)µr(dx) = pµ(x|θ)pir(x)dx and P (dx|θ) = p(x|θ)dx
and so pµ(x|θ) = p(x|θ)
pir(x)
On the other side the modulus ∆ can also be reexpressed as a function of the induced prior
densities pil(x) and pir(x). From the equations (29) and (21),
∆
(
φ−1x c
)
= ∆
(
φ−1c x
)−1
=
H l
(
dφ−1c x
)
Hr
(
dφ−1c x
) = µr(dx)
µl(dx)
=
pir(x)
pil(x)
Combining these two results we get
pµ(x|θ)∆ (φ−1x c) = p(x|θ)pil(x)

Proof of the corollary 1.
PLR(x0, ζ) = Pr
(
(pX|θ0(x0) ≤ ζ pX|θ(x0)
∣∣∣ x0)
= Pr
(
pX|S(X)(x0|S(x0)) pS(X)|θ0(S(x0)) ≤ ζ pX|S(X)(x0|S(x0)) pS(X)|θ(S(x0))
∣∣∣ x0)
because since S(x) is a function of x, pX|θ(x) = pX,S(X)|θ
(
x, S(x)
)
and since in addition S(X) is
a sufficient statistic of X,
pX|θ(x) = pX|S(X),θ
(
x|S(x)) pS(X)|θ(S(x))
= pX|S(X)
(
x|S(x)) pS(X)|θ(S(x))(30)
Simplifying the densities which do not depend on θ,
PLR(x0, ζ) = Pr
(
pS(X)|θ0
(
S(x0)
) ≤ ζ pS(X)|θ0(S(x0)) ∣∣∣ S(x0)) if pX|S(X)(x0|S(x0)) > 0
= Pr
(
pS(X)|θ0
(
S(x0)
)
(pil(S(x0)))
−1 ≤ ζ pS(X)|θ0
(
S(x)
)
(pil(S(x)))−1
∣∣∣θ0) (Th. 1)

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Proof of the corollary 2. First reexpress the PLR under the conditions of the theorem 1 by using
a cumulative distribution. Note T (x) the statistic:
T (x) = pS(X)|θ0
(
S(x)
)
(pil(S(x)))−1
Seen as a random variable, the dataset x induces the random variable T (X) the same way the
statistic S(x) induced S(X). Note FT (X)|θ0 the cumulative distribution of T (X) under the null
hypothesis:
FT (X)|θ0(ζ) = Pr
(
T (x) ≤ ζ∣∣θ0)
Starting from the theorem 1, the PLR can be reexpressed as
PLR(x0, ζ) = 1− FT (X)|θ0
(
ζ−1T (x0)
)
In particular, for a threshold ζ = 1, one can directly notice that the PLR is equal to the
p-value defined for the GLR by the equation (2), but now instead associated to the test statistic
T (x).
Also note that the frequentist test corresponding to the PLR is then given, for any threshold
λ > 0, by
Reject H0 if pS
(
S(x)|θ0
)
(pil(S(x)))−1 ≤ λ

Appendix 4: Proof of the remark 1
If there exists a joint measure over Θ0 × Θ1 × X|H0 and if the events defined on the sets
Θ0 ×X|H0 and Θ1|H0 are independent, then
P (dθ0, dθ1, x|H0) = P (dθ0, x|H0)P (dθ1|H0)
This can be reformulated using the standard previous notations:
P (dθ0, dθ1, x|H0) = Π0(dθ0|x)m0(x)Π1(dθ1)
Then, noting Π01,0(.|x) = P (.|H0, x),
Π01,0(dθ0, dθ1|x) = P (dθ0, dθ1, x|H0)∫
P (dθ0, dθ1, x|H0)
=
m0(x)Π0(dθ0|x)Π1(dθ1)
m0(x)
= Π0(dθ0|x)Π1(dθ1)
Appendix 5: Proof of the proposition 1
Recall that the setR∗(x) defined in equation (16) is the LR set that rejectsH0, and upon which
is defined PLR1 in equation (14). Call PFAB(R∗, x) and PDB(R∗, x) the associated integrals
defined in equations (17) and (18). Call R(x) ⊂ Θ0 × Θ1 any other set and PFAB(R, x) and
PDB(R, x) its associated integrals.
The goal is to show that PFAB(R, x) ≤ PFAB(R∗, x) implies that PDB(R, x) ≤ PDB(R∗, x)
for any test set R. The fact that PDB(R, x) ≤ PDB(R¯∗, x) implies that PFAB(R, x) ≤
PFAB(R¯∗, x) is shown in a reciprocal way.
One can check that the following inequality holds for all x ∈ X , all θ0 ∈ Θ0 and all θ1 ∈ Θ1:(
IR∗(x)(θ0, θ1)− IR(x)(θ0, θ1)
)
(p(x|θ0)− ζp(x|θ1)) ≤ 0
Since the inequality is true for all x, θ0 and θ1, we can multiply the left hand side by any
positive term and integrate over Θ0 ×Θ1. This implies in particular:∫
Θ0
∫
Θ1
Π0(dθ0)
m0(x)
Π1(dθ1)
m1(x)
(
IR∗(x)(θ0, θ1)− IR(x)(θ0, θ1)
)
(p(x|θ0)− ζp(x|θ1)) ≤ 0
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But since Πi(dθi|x) = Πi(dθi)p(x|θi)mi(x)−1 for i = 0, 1, this implies
1
m1(x)
∫
Θ0
∫
Θ1
Π0(dθ0|x)Π1(dθ1)
(
IR∗(x)(θ0, θ1)− IR(x)(θ0, θ1)
)
− ζ
m0(x)
∫
Θ0
∫
Θ1
Π1(dθ1|x)Π0(dθ0)
(
IR∗(x)(θ0, θ1)− IR(x)(θ0, θ1)
) ≤ 0
where we recognize PFAB and PDB as defined in equations (17) and (18):
PFAB(R∗(x))− PFAB(R(x))
m1(x)
− ζPDB(R
∗(x))− PDB(R(x))
m0(x)
≤ 0
Therefore we finally have
ζ
PDB(R(x))− PDB(R∗(x))
m0(x)
≤ PFAB(R(x))− PFAB(R
∗(x))
m1(x)
from which we conclude the final implication
PFAB(R(x)) ≤ PFAB(R∗(x)) ⇒ PDB(R(x)) ≤ PDB(R∗(x))
The fact that PDB(R, x) ≤ PDB(R¯∗, x) implies that PFAB(R, x) ≤ PFAB(R¯∗, x) is shown
in a reciprocal way.
